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INTRODUCTION 1
A mineral servitude as defined by article 21 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code 2 is “the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the
purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to
possession and ownership.” 3
One of the three “basic mineral rights that may be created by a
landowner,” 4 the mineral servitude is a prescriptible right in that it will
extinguish if not “used” within ten years of its date of creation. 5 The pertinent regime of prescription is called “nonuse,” defined by article 3448 of
the Louisiana Civil Code as “a mode of extinction of a real right other than
ownership as a result of failure to exercise the right for a period of time.” 6
An exception to this rule of prescriptibility exists with reference to an
“imprescriptible” mineral servitude, 7 which is a mineral servitude created
by express reservation in the contract of sale to or in the judgment of
Copyright 2022, by PATRICK S. OTTINGER.
* Ottinger Hebert, L.L.C., Lafayette, Louisiana. The author is a member of
the Louisiana and Texas Bars and serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at the
Paul M. Hebert Law Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He is the Reporter,
Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute and the Immediate
Past Chairman, Advisory Council, Louisiana Mineral Law Institute.
1. This Article is an adaptation of materials contained in Part I.D of Patrick
S. Ottinger, Current Issues Under the Louisiana Law of Oil and Gas, 59 S. TEX.
L. REV. 377, 390 (2018).
2. Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1–
31:217 (1974)).
3. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2021). For a thorough explication on the mineral
servitude, see Patrick S. Ottinger, Mineral Servitudes, in LOUISIANA MINERAL
LAW TREATISE, ch. 4 (Patrick H. Martin ed., Claitor’s Law Books & Publishing
Division, Inc. 2012) [hereinafter OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE].
4. “The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.” LA. REV. STAT. §
31:16.
5. Id. § 31:27(1).
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3448 (2021).
7. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149 (emphasis added). Notably, this statute operates
in connection with a sale of land to an “acquiring authority” in which “a mineral
right subject to the prescription of nonuse is reserved.” Id. § 31:149(B). This
would therefore include the reservation of a mineral royalty, but one rarely, if
ever, encounters such a reservation. For a thorough explication on the mineral
royalty, see Patrick S. Ottinger, Mineral Royalties, in LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW
TREATISE, ch. 5 (Patrick H. Martin ed., Claitor’s Law Books & Publishing
Division, Inc. 2012).
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expropriation in favor of an “acquiring authority.” An “acquiring authority” includes both a governmental body and a “legal entity with authority
to expropriate or condemn.” 8 Anyone who has driven over an interstate
highway in the state of Louisiana has driven over land burdened by an
imprescriptible mineral servitude.
In 2012, Act No. 702 (“Act 702”) of the Louisiana Legislature
amended Title 19 of the Revised Statutes—the principal statutes on
expropriation. 9 These amendments introduced a significant amount of
uncertainty in relation to a conventional acquisition of land containing an
express reservation of a mineral servitude compliant with the strictures of
Mineral Code article 149, confected after August 1, 2012, by a “legal
entity with authority to expropriate or condemn.” As will be explained,
this lament of a title examiner will first manifest itself in 2022.
This Article examines the significant title issues presented by Act 702.
Part I reviews the nature and workings of the mineral servitude, particularly how it is created and how the rules of prescription of nonuse pertain
to it, as well as the history and current legislative scheme relative to imprescriptible mineral servitudes. Part II focuses on the “acquiring authority,”
whose acquisition of land by conventional sale might result in the
establishment of an imprescriptible mineral servitude reserved by the
vendor. Finally, Part III explores the uncertainty introduced by Act 702 of
2012 in reference to the type of legal entity entitled to avail itself of the
power of expropriation.
I. THE MINERAL SERVITUDE
A. Mineral Servitudes
A mineral servitude is a “real right” and is “subject either to the
prescription of nonuse for ten years or to special rules of law governing
the term of their existence.” 10 Concerning the mineral servitude, it is the
former—a prescriptive regime. 11
Indicatively, the Mineral Code provides that a “mineral servitude is
extinguished by: . . . prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years.” 12

8. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(A).
9. Act No. 702, 2012 La. Acts 2921. Herein referred to as “Act 702.”
10. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:16.
11. This tenet is a codification of the essential ruling of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La.
1922).
12. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1).
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Thus, unless the servitude is “used” without a lapse of ten years, it will
terminate. 13
“To use a servitude, so as to interrupt prescription, is to use it in the
manner contemplated by the grant or reservation.” 14 This use principally
includes the conduct of drilling operations or securing of production.
B. Imprescriptible Mineral Servitudes
Motivated by important policy considerations, Louisiana law recognizes an important exception to this rule of prescriptibility, the “imprescriptible” mineral servitude. 15
Article 149 of the Louisiana Mineral Code regulates mineral servitudes not subject to the prescription of nonuse. Essentially, if land is
acquired by an “acquiring authority,” and if the vendor expressly reserves
minerals in such a transaction, the “prescription of the mineral right is
interrupted as long as title to the land remains with the acquiring authority,
or any successor that is also an acquiring authority.” 16
The imprescriptible mineral servitude constitutes a statutory innovation dating back to the acquisition of vast quantities of land in the 1930s
and 1940s in connection with public works projects constructed and
administered as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. 17 The
federal government acquired land for various public projects, including
military, flood protection, wildlife conservation, and other public purposes.

13. See Patrick S. Ottinger, All Good Things Must Come to an End: The
Launch, Life, and Loss of a Mineral Servitude, 81 LA. L. REV. 1130 (2021).
14. La. Petrol. Co. v. Broussard, 135 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931).
15. See OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 3, § 418; see
also Paul A. Strickland, Imprescriptible Mineral Servitude Issues, 68 ANN. INST.
ON MIN. LAW (2021). The respected author of this Article examines in detail the
full legislative history of prior Acts that have now been incorporated into article
149 of the Mineral Code.
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(B). One should note the inconsistent
terminology employed in article 149. In one instance, reference is made to the
servitude’s “imprescriptibility”—that is, that the servitude is not subject to
prescription at all. Id. In another instance, the article states that the “prescription
of the mineral right is interrupted as long as title to the land remains with the
acquiring authority, or any successor that is also an acquiring authority,” a
formulation suggestive of the notion that it is afflicted with prescription, which is
merely suspended. Id.
17. See MICHAEL HILTZIK, THE NEW DEAL: A MODERN HISTORY (Free Press
2011).
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Landowners in most states (this Article uses Texas as an example)
desired to reserve their rights to minerals, whether the transfer was by conventional deed or by condemnation. 18 A mineral reservation in other states
created a mineral estate which exists in perpetuity.19 In stark contrast, the
reservation of rights to minerals by landowners in Louisiana created a
mineral servitude subject to the rules of prescription but did not create a
separate mineral estate as such was not legally permissible under Louisiana law. 20
The court in United States v. Nebo Oil Co. 21 explained the state of
affairs motivating the adoption of the early statutes of imprescriptibility:
Prior to the year 1936 the United States was interested in purchasing lands in Louisiana for national forest purposes and had
found that owners of large tracts of land were unwilling to sell
their lands because of court decisions holding that the sale or
reservation of mineral rights in Louisiana created only a right in
the nature of a servitude which was subject to prescription by then
years nonuser. However, the United States Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service, was not in accord with this view and
on May 29, 1935, submitted to Bodcaw Lumber Company an
opinion of the Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture
to the effect that the prescriptive provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code would not apply to lands sold to the United States for
national forest purposes. 22

18. “The process of exercising the power of eminent domain is commonly
referred to as ‘condemnation’, or, ‘expropriation.’” Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline
Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002) (quoting
Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
19. See Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292
(Tex. 1923) (“The question whether gas and oil in place were capable of separate
ownership and sale was carefully considered and finally determined by this court
in Texas Co. v. Daugherty, [176 S. W. 717]. The opinion in that case leaves no
room for reasonable doubt as to the soundness of the conclusion that gas and oil
in place are objects of distinct ownership and sale as a part of the land.”).
20. Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668–89 (La. 1923) (“And
we therefore conclude that there is in this state no such estate in lands as a
corporeal ‘mineral estate,’ distinct from and independent of the surface estate; that
the so-called ‘mineral estate’ by whatever term described, or however, acquired
or reserved, is a mere servitude upon the land in which the minerals lie, giving
only the right to extract such minerals and appropriate them.”).
21. 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
22. Id. at 1005.
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In response to this concern and the understandable reluctance of Louisiana
landowners to sell their land for these public purposes, the Legislature
enacted Act Nos. 68 23 and 151 24 of 1938 which classified as imprescriptible mineral reservations in certain land acquisitions by the State of
Louisiana or the United States (“U.S.”). These statutes were intended to
place Louisiana landowners on par with their Texas counterparts who had
the ability—not enjoyed in Louisiana—to establish a perpetual mineral
estate. 25
In 1940, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act No. 315 which
repealed the 1938 legislation and adopted a new statute that exempted
mineral servitudes created in transactions between Louisiana landowners
and the U.S. from the usual rules of prescription. 26
While the 1938 legislation was limited to acquisitions in connection
with particular types of projects—“spillway or floodway” (Act No. 68)
and “public work and/or improvement” (Act No. 151)—and thus necessitated a determination as to the purpose for which land was being acquired
to confirm its applicability, the 1940 legislation was not as restricted.
Act No. 315 of 1940 applied only to acquisitions by the federal government, whereas Act Nos. 68 and 151 of 1938 applied to acquisitions by
both the state and federal governments. This distinction gave rise to
concerns as to the constitutionality of the 1940 legislation to the extent that
it discriminated against the federal government, thus arguably denying it
the equal protection of the law. 27
In 1958, the legislation was amended and reenacted as Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:5806; subsection (A) regulated acquisitions by
the federal government while subsection (B) regulated acquisitions by the
state of Louisiana. 28 Thus, between 1940 and 1958, no legislation existed,
rendering mineral reservations contained in acquisitions by the state of
Louisiana imprescriptible.

23. Act No. 68, 1938 La. Acts 187.
24. Act No. 151, 1938 La. Acts 362.
25. See OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 3, § 418.
26. Act No. 315, 1940 La. Acts 1249.
27. See Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 893 (5th Cir.
2001) (“While we are sympathetic to the Government’s argument [that Act 315
unconstitutionally discriminates against the United States and therefore cannot be
applied retroactively or prospectively], we are foreclosed from considering the
constitutionality of Act 315 as discriminatory against the United States by our
prior decision in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.”). In the interest of
full disclosure, the author represented a defendant in this suit.
28. Act No. 278, 1958 La. Acts 887.
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The Louisiana Mineral Code was adopted in 1974. 29 The rules pertinent to the imprescriptible mineral servitude were originally set forth in
articles 149 through 152. While the original provision contained in the
Louisiana Mineral Code pertained only to acquisitions by the government,
an amendment in 1980 extended the statute to “any legal entity with expropriation authority.” 30
The current version of the law is now entirely in article 149 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code, as amended and enacted in 2004. 31
As a passing observation, one notes that the title to Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 31:149 is, in pertinent part, “Mineral rights reserved from
acquisitions of land by governments or agencies thereof imprescriptible.”
Additionally, article 149 is placed in Chapter 8 of Title 31 of the Revised
Statutes entitled: “Mineral Rights in Land Acquired or Expropriated by
Governments or Governmental Agencies.” Thus, notably, the headings to
both the section and the chapter in which it reposes make no reference to
an acquisition of land by a private entity possessing the power of expropriation. Seemingly, the aforenoted legislative amendments in 2004 failed
to adjust or revise these titles to reflect the expansion of the establishment
of an imprescriptible mineral servitude to transactions involving an
acquisition of land by a non-governmental entity. While an apt observation, it is of no particular importance as “[h]eadings to sections . . . are
given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of
the law.” 32
II. THE “ACQUIRING AUTHORITY”
A. Preface
A critical component of the creation of an imprescriptible mineral
servitude is that the land must be acquired by an “acquiring authority,”
defined (in relevant part) in article 149(A)(2) of the Louisiana Mineral
Code as follows: “‘Acquiring authority’ for the purposes of this Section

29. Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1–
31:217 (1974)). For a discussion of the interesting history of the multi-decade
effort to develop and enact a Mineral Code, see Patrick S. Ottinger, From the
Courts to the Code: The Origin and Development of the Law of Louisiana on
Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 5 (2012).
30. Act No. 348, 1980 La. Acts 864; Act No. 371, 1980 La. Acts 905. Each
of these Acts was signed by the governor on the same day.
31. Act No. 919, 2004 La. Acts 2837.
32. LA. REV. STAT. § 1:13(A) (2021).

320

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

means . . . any legal entity with authority to expropriate or condemn,
except an electric public utility acquiring land without expropriation.” 33
The explicit carve-out from the identification of a legal entity possessing the power of expropriation—“except an electric public utility
acquiring land without expropriation”—seems to disallow the creation of
an imprescriptible mineral servitude in a conventional sale of land to such
a legal entity. 34 Simultaneously, it seemingly affirms the notion that a sale
of land to all other legal entities possessing the power of expropriation
does in fact create such a servitude; otherwise, the exception or carve-out
would be meaningless and unnecessary. 35
As it pertains to the establishment of an imprescriptible mineral servitude, the acquisition of land by an “acquiring authority” with respect to
which “a mineral right subject to the prescription of nonuse is reserved in
the instrument . . . by which the land is acquired” may be accomplished
consensually “through act of sale, exchange, donation, or other contract,”
or involuntarily, “by condemnation, appropriation, or expropriation.” 36
This Article focuses solely on a conventional acquisition of land by a
“legal entity,” rather than on an involuntary divestiture by way of expropriation.
B. Types of Legal Entities That Might Be an “Acquiring Authority”
The reference in Mineral Code article 149(A)(2) to “any legal entity
with authority to expropriate or condemn” is an allusion to the types of
non-governmental entities identified in Louisiana Revised Statutes section

33. Id. § 31:149(A). Omitted from the textual definition of this important
term are certain governmental bodies (state and federal), see id. § 31:149(A)(1),
and a “nonprofit entity, . . . organized and operated as a public charitable
organization, that is certified by the secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources to be a state or national land conservation organization,” see id. §
31:149(A)(3); these features are not pertinent to the immediate analysis.
34. The term “electric public utility” is not used in the text of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 19:2. However, it is presumed that this is a reference to a legal
entity “generating, transmitting, and distributing or for transmitting or distributing
electricity and steam for power, lighting, heating, or other such uses,” as identified
in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 19:2(11).
35. “The legislature is presumed to have acted with deliberation and to have
enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject
matter.” Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc.,
943 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (La. 2006). In the interest of full disclosure, the author
filed an amicus curiae brief before the Supreme Court in this case.
36. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(B).
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19:2 which, by its heading, addresses, “Expropriation by state or certain
corporations, limited liability companies, or other legal entities.”
Disregarding subsection (1) of section 19:2 dealing with the “state or
its political corporations or subdivisions created for the purpose of exercising any state governmental powers,” this statute identifies 11 potential
non-governmental expropriators in connection with 11 purposes for
potential expropriation.
Of the remaining enumerated purposes, subparts (2) through (7) and
subparts (9) through (12) make reference to “[a]ny domestic or foreign
corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity created for, or
engaged in,” an articulated purpose for which the power of expropriation
might be availed. 37 Notably, the text of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
19:2 does not reference a partnership, but a partnership would be
encompassed in the several references to “other legal entities.” 38
At the outset, it is suggested that a more apt reference in Mineral Code
article 149(A) to a non-governmental “acquiring authority” might have
been a “juridical person.” This is not to insinuate that the reference in
article 149 to a “legal entity” is a concept that is not understood or is insufficient in any respect. Rather, “juridical person” is deemed to be a more
appropriate term because the Louisiana Civil Code provides a definition
of that term as “an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a
corporation or a partnership.” 39
Louisiana Civil Code article 24 further provides the “personality of a
juridical person is distinct from that of its members.” 40 A “juridical
person” is distinguished from the other “kind[]” of person, a “natural
person,” which refers to a “human being.” 41
The precise term “legal entity” appears in the Louisiana Civil Code
only a single time in an article describing the persons in whose favor a
right of use might be established. 42 In contrast, the term “juridical person”
37. Subpart (11) of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 19:2 states “[a]ny domestic
or foreign corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity engaged in
any of the activities otherwise provided for in this Section,” thus not providing a
new or additional purpose for which the right of expropriation might be availed.
38. See id. Louisiana subscribes to the “entity” theory of partnership,
regulated by Title XI of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code, composing articles
2801 through 2844. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 cmt. e (2021) (“As a juridical
person, a partnership is a legal entity distinct from the partners who compose it.”).
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2021).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. art. 641 (“A right of use may be established in favor of a natural
person or a legal entity.”).
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is employed 15 times. The term “entity” appears in a number of codal
articles, including “business entity,” and in each context, it is employed in
a manner envisioning a “legal entity,” or more precisely, a “juridical person.” 43
The types of juridical persons envisioned in Louisiana law certainly
include a business corporation, a limited liability company, and a partnership, including a limited partnership or partnership in commendam. 44
C. Purpose for Which Land Might Be Acquired by an “Acquiring
Authority”
Interestingly, there is no requirement in the text of article 149 that the
qualifying conventional acquisition by a legal entity “with authority to
expropriate or condemn” actually be in connection with a precise and
distinct project or enterprise involving one of the activities for which a
legal entity might be authorized to expropriate, e.g., for the construction
of a pipeline or utility line. Rather, the focus is on the character of the
vendee (a “legal entity with authority to expropriate or condemn” 45)
instead of on the actual purpose for which the land is acquired. 46 This
seemingly means a qualifying “acquiring authority” can purchase land for
the construction of an office building (but not precisely for the enumerated
purpose), and the reservation of minerals by the vendor would conceivably
be imprescriptible.
To illustrate, a natural gas transportation company—or, stated more
precisely, a legal entity whose principal business is “the piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with natural
gas” 47—can expropriate land for the laying of a pipeline. If a mineral
servitude is reserved in the instrument of acquisition, that servitude would
be imprescriptible (assuming full compliance with all relevant legal requirements). 48
This textual omission of a purpose is noteworthy in connection with a
conventional sale when one compares it to a qualifying expropriation.
43. See, e.g., id. art. 3042(2) (“A commercial suretyship is one in which: . . .
(2) The principal obligor or the surety is a business corporation, partnership, or
other business entity.”).
44. It is virtually unimaginable that an expropriation project would be
undertaken by a partnership, due to the absence of limited liability.
45. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(A)(1).
46. See id. § 31:149.
47. See id. § 19:2(5).
48. See discussion infra Part II.D (examining the nature of the interest in land
that might be acquired by an “acquiring authority”).
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While this Article is not concerned with the creation of an imprescriptible
mineral servitude arising out of expropriation by a non-governmental
entity meeting the definition of an “acquiring authority,” recognition
should be made of the fact that, in an expropriation, the Louisiana Constitution provides “Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private
entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary
purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial
question.” 49
Thus, in an expropriation proceeding, an inherent constitutional safeguard exists dictating that the purpose for which the land is acquired by an
“acquiring authority” must be “for a public and necessary purpose”
according to article I, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution, as further
elaborated in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:2.
In stark contrast, the conventional land acquisition by a legal entity
that might give rise to a reservation creating an imprescriptible mineral
servitude is not, by explicit terms, so circumscribed. Thus, Mineral Code
article 149 simply states:
When land is acquired from any person by an acquiring authority
through act of sale, exchange, donation, or other contract . . . , and
a mineral right subject to the prescription of nonuse is reserved in
the instrument . . . by which the land is acquired, prescription of
the mineral right is interrupted as long as title to the land remains
with the acquiring authority, or any successor that is also an
acquiring authority. 50
It might be that the land is acquired on a conventional basis by a juridical
person (or “legal entity”) as a result of successful negotiations to forego or
obviate the need for expropriation as it is an essential requirement that the

49. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4. The issue of what constitutes a “public purpose”
took on a significant meaning by reason of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), in which it
was held that the defendant-city’s exercise of eminent domain power in
furtherance of an economic development plan satisfied the constitutional “public
purpose” requirement. In response to Kelo, article I, section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution was amended in 2006 to restrict the definition of “public purpose.”
Hence, post-2006, the Louisiana Constitution provides that neither economic
development, enhancement of tax revenue, nor any incidental public benefit shall
be considered when determining whether the taking or damaging of private
property serves a public purpose.
50. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(B) (2021).
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party seeking expropriation must first comply with the strictures of the
law. 51
Indeed, courts have consistently held that, before bringing suit, an
expropriating authority must make a good faith attempt to acquire the
property conventionally through negotiation. 52 The failure to do so subjects the expropriation suit to dismissal for prematurity. 53 “The requirement of negotiation is met, however, if the condemnor makes a good faith
attempt to acquire a conventional right of way prior to filing an
expropriation suit.” 54
This pre-suit negotiation requirement constitutes an inherent safeguard that the land acquired in a conventional manner (in lieu of expropriation) will be put to a use or purpose for which expropriation is
authorized by law. Otherwise, the vendor would conceivably have a basis
to seek dissolution of the sale for error if the vendee did not pursue or
effectuate the use to which the parties had agreed through the requisite preexpropriation negotiation process. 55
Yet this possible “inherent safeguard” exists only if the vendee intends
to pursue a potential expropriation, thereby triggering the prerequisite to
engage in pre-suit negotiations with the landowner. If the vendee—who
otherwise meets the statutory definition of an “acquiring authority”—
simply approaches the landowner and negotiates a direct purchase of the
land (not as a result of pre-expropriation negotiation), the transaction still
meets the condition or circumstance of a conventional acquisition of land
“acquired from any person by an acquiring authority.” 56

51. See id. § 19:2 (“Prior to filing an expropriation suit, an expropriating
authority shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement as to compensation
with the owner of the property sought to be taken and comply with all of the
requirements of R.S. 19:2.2.”). Only if “unable to reach an agreement with the
owner as to compensation,” may any of the enumerated entities “expropriate
needed property.” Id.
52. Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Levert-St. John, Inc., 463 So. 2d 964, 967 (La.
Ct. App. 1985) (“Negotiation is a prerequisite to bringing suit for expropriation.
LSA–R.S. 19:2. The requirement is met when the expropriating authority makes
a good faith attempt to acquire the property by conventional agreement.”).
53. City of Thibodaux v. Hillman, 464 So. 2d 370, 372 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(“The failure to negotiate with the landowners prior to institution of an
expropriation suit subjects the suit to dismissal for prematurity.”).
54. Cent. La. Elec. Co. v. Brooks, 201 So. 2d 679, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
55. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 (2021).
56. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(B) (“[w]hen land is acquired from any person
by an acquiring authority . . .”).
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Because the text of article 149 of the Mineral Code does not explicitly
limit its application to an acquisition for a particular purpose, it is significant as it concerns parties who might be motivated by a nefarious or
sinister objective to enter into a transaction in which land is sold to a legal
entity meeting the definition of “acquiring authority” for the sole purpose
of creating a mineral servitude not subject to the prescription of nonuse.
This deviation would be contrary to the established rules of prescription
that embody a matter of public policy which cannot fundamentally be
varied or defeated by contract. 57
D. Nature of the Interest in Land Acquired by Acquiring Authority
Louisiana civil law recognizes a limited number of tenures, or
interests, in land. 58 Principally, depending on the needs of the “acquiring
authority,” one may acquire either full ownership of the land 59 or a lesser
interest called a personal servitude of use. 60
A recognized principle of expropriation law is that the expropriating
authority should only take the least interest necessary to achieve its
57. See Chi. Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., 131 So. 2d 635, 651
(La. Ct. App. 1961) (Hardy, J., dissenting) (“The public policy, as relates to the
prescription of nonuser as applied to mineral servitudes, is directed against
attempts to renounce prescription in advance, or to suspend or to interrupt
prescription by means other than user or other means expressly recognized by law,
such as acknowledgments made specifically for the purpose and with the intention
of interrupting the running of prescription. What the courts have considered as
contrary to public policy are agreements which seek to cause the lands to be
burdened with mineral servitudes for more than 10 years without user.”).
58. See Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 667 (La. 1923) (“On
the contrary, our civil law, coming to us through Roman, Spanish, and French
sources, recognizes but two kinds of estates in lands, the one corporeal and termed
ownership, being the dominion over the soil and all that lies directly above and
below it; and the other incorporeal and termed servitude (including usufruct)
being a charge imposed upon land for the utility of other lands or persons.”
(citations omitted)); see also Harper v. Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377, 382 (La.
1847) (“The modifications of the right of property under our laws are few and
easily understood, and answer all the purposes of reasonable use. It is incumbent
on courts to maintain them in their simplicity.”).
59. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 477 (“Ownership is the right that confers on a person
direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing may
use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established
by law.”).
60. Id. art. 639 (“The personal servitude of right of use confers in favor of a
person a specified use of an estate less than full enjoyment.”).
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purpose. 61 Thus, in many cases, if rights to land are acquired by way of
expropriation, a personal servitude of right of use would more likely be
acquired, as opposed to full ownership of the pipeline strip or corridor.
This is no particular problem in the case of a pipeline, for example. It
would be atypical if the ownership of land were acquired by expropriation
for the installation and operation of a pipeline. More commonly, rights to
lay a pipeline are established by an instrument known as a pipeline
“easement.” 62
If a personal servitude of right of use is acquired, no change of title to
the land occurs (simply the establishment of a real burden on the land) and,
hence, no occasion to reserve a mineral servitude, as the rights to minerals
remain with the landowner now burdened by the pipeline servitude. 63
Yet, in some instances, ownership of the land might be necessary. An
example would be a tract of land needed by a non-governmental “acquiring authority” for a field office or a compression or metering station
associated with a pipeline project. In that event, a mere personal servitude
of right of use would be deemed insufficient to serve the purposes of the
expropriator. The necessity for full ownership (rather than a mere servitude) would entail an acquisition of land by an “acquiring authority,” and
an imprescriptible mineral servitude could be reserved.
Certainly, the very text of article 149(B) acknowledges the notion that
land, rather than a lesser interest, might be obtained by an “acquiring authority.” 64

61. See New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gay, 32 La. Ann. 471, 474–75 (La.
1880) (“[T]he public can take no more, either in quantity or estate, than will
suffice the public wants. If necessary, the fee may undoubtedly be taken; but if
not necessary, it cannot. If a servitude or right of way will answer all the purposes
of the plaintiff, to take more would be to violate the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”).
62. Quibodeaux v. Andrus, 886 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is
also uniformly accepted in the law of Louisiana that the common law word
‘easement’ is the same as the Louisiana ‘servitude.’”).
63. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (2021) (“Ownership of land does not include
ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous
form, or of any elements or compounds in solution, emulsion, or association with
such minerals. The landowner has the exclusive right to explore and develop his
property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to possession and
ownership.”).
64. See id. § 31:149(B) (“[w]hen land is acquired from any person by an
acquiring authority . . .”).
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E. Prior to 2012, in Order to Have the Power of Expropriation, a Legal
Entity Had to Be “Created for” a Purpose Enumerated in Louisiana
Revised Statutes Section 19:2
Prior to Act 702, the juridical persons empowered to avail themselves
of the laws of expropriation included particular entities “created for”
certain specific purposes enumerated in Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 19:2. 65
In view of the foregoing, prior to 2012, examining the organizational
papers of a legal entity involved in such a transaction was both necessary
and sufficient (a legal entity being an expropriator, a plaintiff in an expropriation suit, or a vendee in a sale of land wherein the vendor reserves a
mineral servitude) to determine with certitude that the legal entity had been
“created for” any of the purposes enumerated in Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 19:2.
Thus, a title examiner had the ability to scrutinize and examine the
organizational articles of the pertinent legal entity66 and make a determination as to whether the vendee was in fact an “acquiring authority.” 67 This,
65. Included are the construction of railroads, toll roads, or navigation canals;
the construction and operation of street railways, urban railways, or interurban
railways; the construction or operation of waterworks, filtration and treating
plants, or sewerage plants to supply the public with water and sewerage; the
piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with
natural gas; the purpose of transmitting intelligence by telegraph or telephone; the
purpose of generating, transmitting, and distributing, or for transmitting or distributing electricity and steam for power, lighting, heating, or other such uses, and
piping and marketing of coal or lignite in whatever form or mixture convenient
for transportation within a pipeline.
66. The Model Business Corporation Act, effective January 1, 2015, has
eliminated the requirement (under prior law) that the articles be filed in “the office
of the recorder of mortgages of the parish in which the registered office of the
corporation is located,” LA. REV. STAT. § 12:25(D), Act No. 328, 2014 La. Acts
1191 (repealed 2014). However, the articles would be available in the office of
the Secretary of State. See id. § 12:1-123(B).
67. See Calcasieu & S. Ry. Co. v. Bel, 69 So. 2d 40, 41–42 (La. 1953) (“The
plaintiff by its charter is an organization constituted under the laws of this state
for the construction of a railroad, and is thus a corporation to which this article
gives the right of expropriation.” (emphasis added)); Cent. La. Elec. Co. v. Pugh,
96 So. 2d 523, 525–26 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Terzia,
138 So. 2d 874, 875–76 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (rejecting an argument that the
plaintiff-corporation failed to prove it had the right of expropriation, calling such
argument “so technical and unreasonable as to hardly be worthy of consideration.”).
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in turn, allowed the examiner to immediately determine if the vendor’s
reserved mineral servitude was (or was not) subject to prescription.
III. ACT NO. 702 OF 2012
A. Preface
Act 702, enacted in 2012, amended certain sections of Title 19 of the
Revised Statutes, Expropriation, including section 2 of Title 19 identifying the types of juridical persons enjoying the power of expropriation or
condemnation. This legislation made numerous procedural and substantive changes to the law of expropriation (including a change to the socalled “St. Julien Doctrine”), 68 but for the purposes of this Article, only
one amendment made to the statute is deemed worthy of commentary.
Signed by Governor Bobby Jindal on June 11, 2012, 69 Act 702
amended Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:2 so as to expand the
“created for” standard of eligibility for the right of a juridical person to
expropriate to include a legal entity “engaged in” certain specified
activities. 70

68. Taking its name from the decision in St. Julien v. Morgan Louisiana &
Texas Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (La. 1883), this doctrine stands for the
proposition that a landowner who acquiesces in the installation of facilities on its
property by a party having the power of expropriation forfeits the right to demand
the removal of the facilities and is relegated to a claim for money damages. Later
overruled by Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 330 So. 2d 914 (La.
1976), the doctrine is now codified in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:14.
69. This legislation became effective on August 1, 2012.
70. Although section 19:2(11), prior to the 2012 amendment, listed as an
entity having the right to expropriate, “[a]ny domestic or foreign limited liability
company engaged in any of the activities otherwise provided for in this Section,”
this subsection, by its explicit terms, does not reach or apply to corporations or
partnerships. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2(11) (emphasis added) (amended 2012).
Hence, the pre-2012 “engaged in” feature only pertained to expropriation by an
LLC. See id.
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B. Act 702 Extends the Power of Expropriation to a Juridical Person
“Engaged in” a Stated Activity
If a corporation was created “for any lawful business or activity,” 71 or
if a limited liability company was organized “for any lawful purpose,” 72
(and, hence, was not “created for” one of the enumerated purposes) but is
in fact “engaged in” certain specified activities, a reservation of a mineral
servitude in a sale of a land to (or an expropriation by) such “acquiring
authority” might be imprescriptible as a result of the enactment of Act 702.
Because of this new statutory development, the situation turns somewhat murky, and the life of the title examiner becomes rather complicated.
Now that the touchstone for the power of expropriation has been expanded
to include an entity “engaged in” those specified activities (even if the
legal entity was not explicitly “created for” such purpose), this new
standard gives rise to the need to evaluate a factual matter not reflected by
the public records and would seemingly necessitate an inquiry into the
activities in which the relevant entity is or has been “engaged.”
Worse still, the acquisition in question might be for purposes unrelated
to the statutory activity, but if that entity is “engaged in” a prescribed
activity in another parish or state (unrelated to the transaction at hand), one
may wonder if that is sufficient to bring that transaction within the ambit
of article 149 so as to render the reserved mineral servitude imprescriptible. As noted previously, 73 nothing in the new statutory formulation
requires the land purchase (with the attendant reservation of a mineral
servitude) be effectuated in connection with a qualifying activity in which
the vendee is actually “engaged.” 74
To illustrate, a corporation or limited liability company “created for”
the generic purpose of engaging in “any lawful” activity or purpose might
actually be “engaged in” a qualifying activity in Bossier Parish, and
thereby might enjoy the power of expropriation in Terrebonne Parish, even

71. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:1-301(A) (“Every corporation incorporated under
this Chapter has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business or activity unless
a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”).
72. Id. § 12:1302(A) (“A limited liability company may be organized under
this Chapter and may conduct business for any lawful purpose, unless a more
limited purpose is stated in its articles of organization.”).
73. See discussion supra Part II.C.
74. Seemingly, a large, multi-national, publicly-traded corporation might be
“engaged in” the piping of natural gas in North Dakota (what about Indonesia?),
but not in Louisiana, and thereby qualify as an “acquiring authority” for purposes
of article 149.
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though its activities in the latter parish (some 300 miles away) are unrelated to the conduct of (or “engagement in”) the specified activity.
The expansion of the subset of juridical persons possessing expropriation power from entities distinctly “created for” an enumerated purpose to
additionally include those legal entities that, while not “created for” one
of those purposes, are nevertheless “engaged in” the activity, is problematic.
As a matter of policy, this statutory expansion is contrary to the established principle that “[e]xpropriation laws are special and exceptional in
character, in derogation of common rights, and as such, must be strictly
construed.” 75 Indisputably, the doctrine of strict construction applies to the
interpretation of a statute but does not operate to constrain the prerogatives
of the legislature to enact laws. 76 Yet, policy should support the proposition that the range of parties vested with the power of expropriation should
only be expanded for a justifiable and articulable reason. As cogently
observed by one commentator:
Louisiana’s prescription laws are the legal expression of public
policy. If the Legislature decides to change the general land policy
of the state, the legality of such legislation cannot be questioned
as long as no state or federal constitutional provision is infringed.
The wisdom of such changes, however, is subject to inquiry. 77
No such reason for this significant expansion is discerned in the available,
yet scant, legislative history of Act 702, and the addition of the “engaged
in” standard creates an unintended consequence when considering its
effect on the law of imprescriptible mineral servitudes.
C. Issues Presented to the Title Examiner
Admittedly, the concerns expressed herein might be assuaged somewhat by the requirement that the “instrument or judgment shall reflect the
intent to reserve or exclude the mineral rights from the acquisition and
their imprescriptibility as authorized under the provisions of this Section
and shall be recorded in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
75. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So. 3d 192, 197 (La.
2010) (citing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Blanchard, 149 So. 2d 615 (La. Ct.
App.), writ denied, 150 So. 2d 590 (1963)).
76. See La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Tarver, 635 So. 2d 1090, 1099 (La.
1994) (“In its exercise of the entire legislative power of the state, the legislature
may enact any legislation the state constitution does not prohibit.”).
77. See A.B. Atkins, Jr., Mineral Rights—Mineral Reservations in Sales of
Land to the United States, 13 LA. L. REV. 153, 156 (1952).
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land is located.” 78 If the instrument or judgment does not reference the
minerals’ “imprescriptibility as authorized under the provisions of this
Section,” the inquiry should end there. 79 However, even with compliance
with this requirement, investigating the underlying facts is still necessary
to determine that the vendee is in fact an “acquiring authority” by reason
of the circumstance that the vendee (while not “created for” a certain
purpose) has “engaged in” a prescribed activity.
Stated differently, merely providing in the instrument of acquisition
that the reserved minerals are “imprescriptib[le] as authorized under the
provisions of” article 149 does not render it, unless it is actually so as a
factual matter, compliant with the strictures of the relevant article. “Bootstrapping” is not allowed here.
Therefore, if, after August 1, 2012, the lawyer reviews title to land in
one parish and finds that land is acquired by a legal entity not “created for”
a certain qualifying purpose, the vendor reserved minerals, and the
reservation is expressly stated to be pursuant to Mineral Code article 149,
how does one ascertain if the mineral servitude is prescriptible or not? An
array of questions is presented, including the following.
What inquiry must be made to ascertain the status or character of the
reserved mineral servitude? Evidently, this necessary inquiry involves a
determination of matters not reflected in the public records. No particular
source of information would reflect the actual conduct of any commercial
activity constituting the “engaging in” a qualifying activity.
Notably, this factual scenario, to the extent that it necessitates an
inquiry or investigation outside of the public records to determine, as a
factual matter, that the vendee is or has been “engaged in” a pertinent
activity, is not of a nature or character that it could be saved or rectified by
operation of article 3339 of the Louisiana Civil Code.80
How does one “prove the negative,” that is, that the entity is not “engaged in” a qualifying activity in a remote parish? The inquiry is not

78. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(B) (2021) (emphasis added).
79. See id.; see also id. § 1:3 (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory and the word
‘may’ is permissive.”).
80. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3339 (2021). This article provides an exception to
the “public records doctrine” as to a “matter of capacity or authority, the
occurrence of a suspensive or a resolutory condition, the exercise of an option or
right of first refusal, a tacit acceptance, a termination of rights that depends upon
the occurrence of a condition, and a similar matter pertaining to rights and
obligations evidenced by a recorded instrument,” by declaring such matters
“effective as to a third person although not evidenced of record.” Id.
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limited to one of the 64 parishes in Louisiana but conceivably concerns
undertakings in other states or nations. 81
Additionally, how long must the entity be “engaged in” the relevant
activity? Is it sufficient that the entity “engages in” the activity on only
one occasion, even occurring a number of years prior to the transaction in
question? Must it be the primary line of business of the relevant legal
entity? Must it have personally conducted the activity directly, or can it be
through a contractor? Or a subsidiary?
If one is able to establish the entity was “engaged in” the activity, how
does one manifest such a conclusion so as to “bind the world” to the extent
that third persons would recognize and accept the imprescriptibility of the
reserved mineral servitude? Certainly, if the vendor reserving the mineral
servitude in reliance on its imprescriptibility wants to sell the servitude in
the future, that remote vendee would need this information to evaluate the
worth or value of the servitude. These are but a few of the obvious issues
presented by the operation of the 2012 legislation as it pertains to the
creation of a servitude as being imprescriptible or not.
CONCLUSION
Act 702 creates an unnecessary burden on a title examiner and thus
potentially results in significant and unnecessary uncertainty in the law.
While important, the issue is admittedly academic until August 1, 2022,
ten years after the 2012 amendment, followed by the creation of a qualifying servitude.
If a use has been made of the mineral servitude created after August
1, 2012, in a conventional sale to an “acquiring authority” not “created
for” the purpose of the acquisition, the issue will still remain academic.
However, if the servitude is not used within ten years of its post-amendment creation (in a sales transaction confected after August 1, 2012),
ascertaining whether the servitude is imprescriptible would be necessary
by reason of having been created in a sale of land to or expropriation by
an “acquiring authority” “engaged in” a qualifying activity.
Article 149 of the Mineral Code should be amended to limit the type
of juridical person possessing the power of expropriation to those “created
for” the purposes enumerated in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:2,
thus returning the issue to the state of affairs prior to the adoption of Act
81. Consider, for example, a large oil and gas company operating in several
states in addition to Louisiana. If that company is active in, say, the Bakken
Formation in North Dakota and is there “engaged in” the laying of pipelines, is
that a sufficient predicate to allow it to invoke the power of expropriation in the
Haynesville Shale Formation in Northwest Louisiana?
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702. Such an amendment to article 149(A)(2) of the Mineral Code might
be such as the following, to-wit: “‘Acquiring authority’ for the purposes
of this Section means . . . (2) any legal entity [created for a purpose
specified in R.S. 19:2(2) through (7) or (9),] with authority to expropriate
or condemn, except an electric public utility acquiring land without
expropriation.” 82
An amendment of this type would leave in place the changes made by
Act 702 in the text of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:2 but would
address the unintended consequence of the circumstances by which an
imprescriptible mineral servitude might be created, limiting it to the situation whereby the ascertainment of a legal entity “created for” an enumerated purpose can be easily accomplished.
At the same time, it is appropriate to amend the headings or titles to
article 149 and Chapter 8 of the Mineral Code for accuracy and clarity and
also to indicate that certain juridical persons (in addition to governmental
entities) are within the ambit of those provisions.
In the meantime, pending the enactment of appropriate clarifying or
amending legislation, the title examiner should consider including a boilerplate paragraph of limitation in a title opinion, alerting the client to this
issue should it ever arise in the future.

82. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:149(A) (emphasis added).

